De redactie van NRC selecteert de beste artikelen uit The Economist voor een breder perspectief op internationale politiek en economie.
Mainstream parties can’t avoid talking to the populist-right front-runner for ever, argues Andreas Rödder.
Dit artikel komt uit The Economist
A smattering of German words, such as Blitzkrieg and Schadenfreude, have made their way into other languages. Among the most recent to begin to do so are Zeitenwende („turning of the times”) and Brandmauer („firewall”). The first reflects the shift in geopolitical thinking in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; the second, mainstream politicians’ determination to isolate extreme parties. However, what was intended to signal that Germans have learned from history has instead plunged their nation into a political crisis. As three state elections loom, starting with Saxony-Anhalt’s on September 6th, that crisis is set to intensify.
European societies are facing a rising tide of young right-wing parties. In Germany the most prominent is the Alternative for Germany (AfD). It was founded in 2013 under the leadership of conservative economists in protest against Angela Merkel’s euro-bailout policies and as an alternative to the centre-right CDU’s shift to the left. Nevertheless, its opponents labelled it „right-wing” from the very beginning—a term that, in German parlance, is the highest form of political delegitimisation and practically synonymous with „far right”.
De redactie van NRC selecteert de beste artikelen uit The Economist voor een breder perspectief op internationale politiek en economie.
This invoked the „militant democracy” that Karl Loewenstein had conceived in 1937 in an effort to prevent a repeat of the National Socialists’ seizure of power in 1933. However, to this day the AfD lacks key characteristics of the Nazis: the Führer principle, paramilitary violence, belief in a totalitarian state. Whether the party is substantially unconstitutional and anti-democratic—claimed time and again by opponents—remains an open question, untested by the Federal Constitutional Court.
The term Brandmauer has been used mostly since the late 2010s. But it has been practised from the AfD’s earliest days: mainstream parties refuse to go into coalition, co-operate or even talk with the party—at least not in the sense of political debate on equal grounds. This political firewall has long been a symbol of identity for the political „centre”.
As a result, Germany has seen a spiral of escalation for over ten years: the more the AfD was marginalised by other parties, the more it radicalised itself; and the more it radicalised itself, the more it was marginalised. The ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, pro-Russian wing grew increasingly powerful, shifting the AfD towards the far right.
This has not stopped the party growing in popularity. It is polling at just below 30%, an all-time high and double its share in 2023. It has a clear lead in two of the three election states and is among the front-runners in the other, traditionally solidly left Berlin. It may win an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt’s state parliament. The CDU/CSU of Chancellor Friedrich Merz—which until the mid-2010s scored consistently in the 30s or low 40s—is second nationally with around 20%. Things are even worse for the main centre-left party, the SPD, which has slumped to 12%. The two traditionally dominant blocs have suffered after overseeing a string of controversial policies: the opening of borders during the European migrant crisis of 2015–16; restrictions on civil liberties during the covid-19 pandemic; the abandoning of nuclear power and the EU’s ban on internal combustion engines, which has rattled the German car industry.
How to deal with the „new-right revolution”? In an incisive recent study, Mark Leonard of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, recommends „curiosity for their ideas and respect for their voters, rather than contempt and bemusement”. In Germany that would mean a willingness to talk to the AfD about its concerns over immigration, foreign policy and the energy transition, drawing red lines instead of erecting firewalls. No alliance with Vladimir Putin, a commitment to the Western alliance and the rule of law, a willingness to integrate legal immigrants—such conditions for co-operation would force the AfD to ask itself whether it wants to moderate its stance and seek political integration, or would prefer radicalism and continued exclusion.
Zeitenwende for the Brandmauer
An AfD absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt (alone or with the tacit support of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, its left-populist equivalent) would turn the Brandmauer to rubble. If it falls short, everything would depend on the CDU. Were the centre-right party to refuse to cut a deal with the AfD or the hard-left Die Linke—both of which it has vowed not to co-operate with, even passing an „incompatibility resolution” to that effect—it is hard to see where a governing majority could come from. There’s no outcome that doesn’t look seismic.
However the state elections play out, Mr Merz faces three options at a federal level. He could play down the results as mere regional incidents and continue his course towards limited reforms. Yet it is hard to imagine that a fragile government and an already unpopular chancellor could last long, especially since the SPD’s leadership is under considerable pressure from its base to prevent even the reforms that have already been agreed.
The second option would be to embark on the sweeping reforms Mr Merz had promised before coming into office, to tackle things like high labour costs, bloated government spending and over-regulation. That would be risky, and could precipitate the collapse of his government or fresh elections. But it is just the sort of strong leadership Germany is crying out for.
The third possibility is that the CDU unravels amid the shockwaves of the state elections. The result would be nothing less than the reshaping of the German party system. This might give rise to a new centre-right movement comprising Christian Democrats, liberal Free Democrats and disillusioned AfD voters, dedicated to reform in areas that matter most to Germans.
The original Zeitenwende concerned Germany’s foreign policy. The country is now faced with its domestic equivalent. And its politicians face a choice between trying to defend an unworkable status quo, or finding the courage to act on Otto von Bismarck’s famous remark that „If there’s to be a revolution, we should rather shape it than suffer it.”
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